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Abstract
In this paper we study a two–player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time
with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be
ambiguous with max–min preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a strategy
and equilibrium concept allowing for ambiguity and show that equilibria can be preemptive (a player
invests at a point where investment is Pareto dominated by waiting) or sequential (one player invests as
if she were the exogenously appointed leader). Following the standard literature, the worst–case prior for
the ambiguous player if she is the second mover is obtained by setting the lowest possible trend in the set
of priors. However, if the ambiguous player is the first mover, then the worst–case prior can be given by
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1 Introduction
Many, if not most, investment decisions taken by firms are characterized by substantial upfront sunk costs,
(partial) irreversibility, and uncertainty over future cash flows (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). As has been
well–recognized since Knight (1921), the uncertainty over future cash flows can seldomly be captured by a
unique probability measure. That is to say, there is typically ambiguity over the correct probability measure.
Extensive experimental evidence has shown that decision makers are typically ambiguity averse (cf. Ellsberg
(1961)).
By incorporating an ambiguity aversion axiom into the subjective expected utility framework, Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) have shown that ambiguity averse decision makers act as if they maximize expected
utility over the worst–case prior within a (subjectively chosen) set of priors. In the context of a firm’s
investment decision it is common to assume that future cash flows develop according to a (continuous–
time) stochastic process. In most of the literature it is assumed that cash flows grow at an expected growth
rate, augmented with shocks that follow a (continuous–time) random walk. Incorporating ambiguity in
such a setting is typically done by assuming that at any time t the expected growth rate is not known,
but can take any value in a given set (this is often referred to as drift ambiguity). The worst–case in this
situation is the lowest possible expected growth rate (cf. Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)). So, in the Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) framework applied to investment problems, the presence of drift ambiguity leads the
firm to act cautiously: by considering the worst possible expected growth rate the firm values future cash
flows assuming that nature will act malevolently. One could interpret this as a “fear of the market”.
In this paper we extend this kind of analysis by including the effects of competition. In most markets firms
are not making investment decisions in isolation; rather decisions are taken in a competitive environment,
often oligopolistic in nature. This implies that a firm not only is ambiguous about future cash flows, but also
about its competitors’ actions. After all, suppose that a firm has just invested in a new technology to obtain
a cost advantage, but that its competitor still has the option to invest as well. It is natural to assume that
investment by the competitor lowers the first adopter’s cash flows. It is similarly innocuous to assume that
the competitor will make its investment decision when it expects the future cash flows to be high enough.
This implies that, in expectation, the competitor will invest sooner when the expected growth rate of cash
flows is higher. This, in turn, means that the worst–case for the first adopter is represented by the earliest
possible time, in expectation, that the competitor invest, i.e. the highest possible expected growth rate. One
can think of this as a “fear of the competitor”.
The problem we address in this paper is two-fold. First, we investigate how these two diametrically op-
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posed “fears” balance: what is the worst–case at any given time t when “fear of the market” suggests the
lowest possible expected growth rate, but “fear of the competitor” suggests the highest possible expected
growth rate? It turns out that we can compute the worst-case prior explicitly: it is either the lowest or the
highest expected growth rate. The regions where each of these worst cases dominates the other can, as we
show, be computed exactly. Secondly, we investigate the impact of ambiguity on equilibrium investment
behavior. In particular, we are interested in (i) constructing an appropriate notion of strategy for timing
games with an ambiguous player,1 and (ii) explore the differences in equilibrium behavior between ambigu-
ous and non–ambiguous players. The latter goal leads us to study an investment game between two firms,
one ambiguous and one non–ambiguous.
Our modeling of drift ambiguity follows the seminal contribution of Chen and Epstein (2002), who
developed a solid framework for dealing with Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) max–min preferences in a
continuous time multiple prior model of ambiguity. This model has been applied to several problems in
economics and finance to gain valuable insights in the consequences of a form of Knightian uncertainty, as
opposed to risk, on economic decisions. The main insight of Chen and Epstein (2002) is that in order to find
the max–min value of a payoff stream under a particular kind of ambiguity (called strongly rectangular)
we need to identify the upper–rim generator of the set of multiple priors, and value the payoff stream as if
this were the true process governing the payoffs. Finding this upper–rim generator is particularly easy if
attention is restricted to so-called κ-ignorance, a form of drift ambiguity, where at each point in time the
drift is assumed to lie within the same compact set.
In this paper, we extend the single–firm Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) model to a timing game between
two firms, which both have the option to invest in a project. We assume that one firm is ambiguous about the
process governing cash-flows and that the other firm (potentially) has a cost disadvantage.2 This assumption
is made to illustrate the difference an introduction of ambiguity makes compared to a purely risky world in
a game theoretic model of investment.
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, contrary to all of the literature on κ–ignorance in a real
options framework, the worst–case prior is not always the lowest possible trend. As in any timing game, an
ambiguous player has to consider the payoffs of the leader and follower roles. The payoffs of the latter role
1Since the seminal contribution of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for deterministic timing games, many attempts to defining
equilibria in stochastic timing games have been made such as Thijssen (2010), Thijssen et al. (2012), de Villemeur et al. (2014),
Boyarchenko and Levendorski (2014), Azevedo and Paxson (2014), Huisman and Kort (2015).
2The assumption that only one firm is ambiguous is not critical. In fact, Section 6 shows that our results can easily be adopted
to the case where both firms are ambiguous, possibly to a different degree.
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follow along very similar lines as in Nishimura and Ozaki (2007), i.e. the worst–case payoff corresponds to
valuing the follower’s payoff stream as if the payoffs are driven by the diffusion with the lowest admissible
trend under κ–ignorance. For the leader’s payoff, however, the situation is different, because of the interplay
between the two opposing forces of “fear of the market” and “fear of the competitor”. In Section 3, we use
an analysis based on backward stochastic differential equations and g–expectations, as introduced by Peng
(1997), to study which effect dominates. It turns out that for small values of the stochastic process, the worst-
case always corresponds to the lowest admissible trend, whereas for higher values the highest admissible
trend may represent the worst-case, depending on the underlying parameters. This result also constitutes a
contribution to the ambiguity literature, because we provide a very natural setting in which the worst–case
prior is non–trivial.
Secondly, in Section 4 we show that equilibria can be of two types. First, there may be preemptive
equilibria in which one of the firms invests at a time where it is not optimal for either firm to do so. This
type of equilibrium is familiar from the literature ( e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Weeds (2002), Pawlina
and Kort (2006)) but we use a technique recently developed by Riedel and Steg (2014) to rigorously prove
existence of this type of equilibrium. It should be pointed out here that in a preemptive equilibrium it is
known a.s. ex ante which firm is going to invest first. This firm will invest at a point in time where its leader
value exceeds its follower value, but where its competitor is indifferent between the two roles. A second
type of equilibrium that can exist is a sequential equilibrium, in which one firm invests at the same it would
if it knew that the other firm could not preempt. Each game always has at least an equilibrium of one of
these two types, which can not co–exist. These two types of equilibrium each lead to a clear prediction, a.s.,
as to which firm invests first. The role of first mover depends crucially on the levels of ambiguity and cost
(dis–) advantage, as we show in a numerical analysis.
As mentioned above we obtain our equilibrium results by using techniques developed by Riedel and
Steg (2014). It should be pointed out that we cannot simply adopt their strategies to our setting due to the
presence of an ambiguous player. In fact, the notion of extended mixed strategy as introduced in Riedel
and Steg (2014) presents a conceptual problem here. An extended mixed strategy consists, in essence, of a
distribution over stopping times as well as a coordination device that allows players to coordinate in cases
where equilibrium considerations require one and only one firm to invest and it is not clear a priori which
firm this should be. In our model we need this coordination device as well, but we do not want ambiguity to
extend to the uncertainty created by this coordination mechanism, i.e. ambiguity is over payoffs exclusively.
This presents problems if we want to define payoffs to the ambiguous firm if it plays a mixture over stopping
times. For equilibrium existence, however, such mixtures are not needed, so we choose to restrict attention
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to what we call extended pure strategies, which consist of a stopping time and an element related to the
coordination mechanism mentioned above. By making this simplifying assumption, together with strong
rectangularity of the set of priors, we can write the worst–case payoff of a pair of extended pure strategies
as a sum of worst–cases of leader and follower payoffs.
In Section 5 we provide some comparative statics. In particular, we explore the effect of a change in
(i) the degree of ambiguity, (ii) the volatility and (iii) firm 2’s cost–disadvantage on equilibrium outcomes.
We show numerically that the investment thresholds of the ambiguous firm increase with the degree of
ambiguity. Due to the construction of the set of priors via κ–ignorance, an increase of volatility not only
increases the variance of future payoffs, but it also expands the set of priors. It turns out that both firms’
investment thresholds rise with the volatility. Due to the effect on the set of priors, however, the thresholds
of the ambiguous firm are more affected by a change of the volatility than those of the unambiguous firm.
Finally, while Pawlina and Kort (2006) argue that in a purely risky world, the low–cost firm always becomes
the leader, we show that this might change if the low–cost firm is sufficiently ambiguous.
2 The Model
We follow Pawlina and Kort (2006) in considering two firms that are competing to implement a new tech-
nology. Uncertainty in the market is modeled on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 ,P) using a
geometric Brownian motion
dXt
Xt
= µdt+ σdBt, (1)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a Wiener process. The sunk costs of investment are I > 0 for firm 1 and ηI , η > 0 for
firm 2. Typically, we will assume that η > 1, so that firm 1 has a cost advantage.
The payoff streams are given by processes (Dk`Xt)t≥0, where Dk`, k, ` = 0, 1, denotes a scaling factor
if the firm’s investment status is k (k = 0 if the firm has not invested and k = 1 if the firm has invested) and
the investment status of the competitor is ` ∈ {0, 1}. It is assumed that D10 > D11 ≥ D00 ≥ D01 ≥ 0, and
that there is a first mover advantage, i.e. D10 −D00 > D11 −D01.
We assume that, although firm 1 has a cost advantage, it is also ambiguous about the drift µ. Following the
recent literature on drift ambiguity in continuous time models, we model priors that the firm considers using
a set of density generators. Denoting this set of density generators by Θ, the set of probability measures that
constitutes the firm’s set of priors is denoted byPΘ. A process (θt)t≥0 is a density generator if the process
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(
M θt
)
t≥0, where
dM θt
M θt
= −θtdBt, M θ0 = 1, (2)
is a P–martingale. Such a process (θt)t≥0 generates a new measure P
θ via the Radon–Nikodym derivative
dPθ/dP = M θ∞.
In order to use density generators as a model for ambiguity the set Θ needs some more structure. Fol-
lowing Chen and Epstein (2002), the set of density generators, Θ, is chosen as follows. Let (Θt)t≥0 be a
collection of correspondences Θt : Ω R, such that
1. There is a compact subset K ⊂ R, such that Θt(ω) ⊆ K, for all ω ∈ Ω and all t ∈ [0, T ];
2. For all t ∈ [0, T ], Θt is compact-valued and convex-valued;
3. For all t ∈ (0, T ], the mapping (s, ω) 7→ Θs(ω), restricted to [0, t]× Ω, isB[0, t]×Ft-measurable;
4. 0 ∈ Θt(ω), dt⊗ dP-a.e.
The set of density generators is then taken to be,
Θ = {(θt)t≥0 |θt(ω) ∈ Θt(ω), dP− a.e., all t ≥ 0},
and the resulting set of measuresPΘ is called strongly-rectangular. For sets of strongly rectangular priors
the following has been obtained by Chen and Epstein (2002):
1. P ∈PΘ;
2. All measures inPΘ are uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to P and are equivalent to P;
3. For every X ∈ L 2(Ω,F ,P), there exists P∗ ∈PΘ such that for all t ≥ 0,
EP
∗
[X|Ft] = inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ[X|Ft]. (3)
Finally, for further reference, define the upper-rim generator (θ∗t )t≥0, where
θ∗t = arg max{σw(t)θt|θt ∈ Θt}. (4)
Note that (θ∗t )t≥0 ∈ Θ.
From Girsanov’s theorem it immediately follows that under Pθ ∈PΘ, the process (Bθt )t≥0, defined by
Bθt = Bt +
∫ t
0
θsds,
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is a Pθ-Brownian motion and that, under Pθ, the process (Xt)t≥0 follows the diffusion
dXt
Xt
= µθ(t)dt+ σdBθt ,
where
µθ(t) = µ− σθt.
In the remainder we will assume that Θt = [−κ, κ], for all t > 0, for some κ > 0. Denote ∆ =
[µ, µ] = [µ − σκ, µ + σκ]. This form of ambiguity is called κ–ignorance (cf. Chen and Epstein (2002)).
The advantages of using this definition of ambiguity are that (i) Θ is strongly rectangular so that the results
stated above apply and (ii) the upper–rim generator takes a convenient form, namely θ∗t = κ, for all t ≥ 0.
In addition, it can easily be shown that
(
Bθt
)
t≥0 is a P-martingale for every (θt)t≥0 ∈ Θ.
Note that Cheng and Riedel (2013) show that κ−ignorance can be applied in an infinite time horizon. In
particular, they show that value functions taken under drift ambiguity in the infinite time horizon are nothing
but the limits of value functions of finite time horizons T as T →∞.
In our model, we assume firm 1 to be ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Finally, the discount rate is assumed to be r > µ and to apply to both firms.
3 Leader and Follower Value Functions
3.1 The Non–Ambiguous Firm
Assume firm 1 becomes the leader at t. Then the non–ambiguous firm 2 solves the optimal stopping problem
F2(xt) = sup
τF2 ≥t
EP
[∫ τF2
t
e−r(s−t)D01Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xs − e−r(τF2 −t)ηI
∣∣∣Ft] . (5)
Thus, τF2 is the optimal time at which firm 2 invests as a follower.
On the other hand, if the non–ambiguous firm becomes the leader at a certain point in time t, its value
function is
L2(xt) = EP
[∫ τF1
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF1
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− ηI
∣∣∣Ft] , (6)
where τF1 denotes the optimal time at which the ambiguous firm invests as a follower. From the standard
literature on real options games (cf. Pawlina and Kort (2006)) we know that the former value function can
be written as
F2(xt) =

xtD01
r−µ +
(
xF2 (D11−D01)
r−µ − ηI
)(
xt
xF2
)β(µ)
, if xt ≤ xF2 ,
xtD11
r−µ − ηI if xt > xF2 ,
(7)
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where τF2 is the first hitting time (from below) of an endogenously determined threshold x
F
2 , i.e
τF2 = inf{s ≥ t|Xs ≥ xF2 }.
The standard procedure of dynamic programming yields that the threshold xF2 is given by
xF2 =
β(µ)
β(µ)− 1
ηI(r − µ)
D11 −D01 ,
where β(µ) is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic 1/2σ2β(µ)(β(µ)− 1) + µβ(µ)− r = 0, i.e.
β(µ) =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
√(
µ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1.
Similarly, we will show below that firm 1’s optimal stopping time in the follower role is the first hitting
time (from below) of a threshold xF1 <∞, i.e.
τF1 = inf{s ≥ t|Xs ≥ xF1 }.
By applying the standard techniques of backward induction and dynamic programming, one can therefore
show that the leader value (6) is given by
L2(xt) =

xtD10
r−µ − ηI +
xF1 (D11−D10)
r−µ
(
xt
xF1
)β(µ)
, if xt ≤ xF1 ,
xtD11
r−µ − I, if xt > xF1 .
Finally, it is possible that both firms invest simultaneously at t. One can show that in that case the value
function of firm 2 is
M2(xt) := EP
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− ηI
∣∣∣Ft] = xtD11
r − µ − ηI.
3.2 The Ambiguous Firm
If ambiguity is introduced, the standard techniques for computing the value functions are not applicable any
longer. In our case, where ambiguity is modeled by a strongly rectangular set of density generators, one
needs, in contrast to the standard case, to allow for changing priors over time.
The value functions for the ambiguous firm 1 of the follower and leader roles are given by
F1(xt) := sup
τF1 ≥t
inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τF1
t
e−r(s−t)D01Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF1
e−r(s−t)D11Xs − e−r(τF1 −t)I
∣∣∣Ft] (8)
and
L1(xt) := inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τF2
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft]− I, (9)
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respectively.
If the set of priorsPΘ is strongly rectangular, it turns out that problem (8) can be reduced to a standard
optimal stopping problem and, hence, can be solved by using standard techniques. This reduction is possible
due to the following lemma, the proof of which is standard and is, thus, omitted.
Lemma 1. LetPΘ be strongly–rectangular. Then
F1(xt) = sup
τF1 ≥t
EP
θ∗
[∫ τF1
t
e−r(s−t)D01Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF1
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− e−r(τF1 −t)I
∣∣∣Ft] , (10)
where (θ∗t )t≥0 is the upper–rim generator (4).
Hence, for the follower problem of the ambiguous firm, the worst–case is always induced by the worst
possible drift µ. This observation indeed makes sense, since the actions of the leader have no influence
on the decision of the follower once the leader has invested. The problem, therefore, reduces to one of a
“monopolistic” decision maker. Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) already showed that for such decisions, the
worst–case is always given by the worst possible trend µ.
In other words, we find that the follower value of the ambiguous firm can be expressed by
F1(xt) =

xtD01
r−µ +
(
xF1 (D11−D01)
r−µ − I
)(
xt
xF1
)β(µ)
, if xt ≤ xF1 ,
xtD11
r−µ − I if xt > xF1 ,
(11)
where
xF1 =
β(µ)
β(µ)− 1
I(r − µ)
D11 −D01 .
In a similar way, one can argue that for simultaneous investment the value function of firm 1 is induced
by the worst–case µ and therefore
M1(xt) := inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− I
∣∣∣Ft] = xtD11
r − µ − I.
The next theorem describes the leader value function of the ambiguous firm. Two cases are distinguished
there. If the difference D10 − D11 is sufficiently small, we find that the worst–case is, as before, always
induced by µ. In case this condition is not satisfied, the worst–case is given by µ for small values xt up to
a certain threshold x∗, where it jumps to µ. The intuition for this fact can already be derived from equation
(9); the lowest trend µ gives the minimal values for the payoff stream (DklXt). However, the higher the
trend µ the sooner the stopping time τF2 is expected to be reached. The higher payoff stream (D10Xt) is
then sooner replaced by the lower one (D11Xt). If the drop of the payoffs becomes sufficiently small, the
former effect always dominates the latter. In this case the worst–case is given by µ for each xt.
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Theorem 1. The worst–case for the leader function of the ambiguous firm is always given by the worst
possible drift µ if and only if the following condition holds
D10 −D11
D10
≤ 1
β1(µ)
. (12)
In this case, the leader function becomes
L1(xt) =

D10xt
r−µ −
(
xt
xF2
)β1(µ) D11−D10
r−µ x
F
2 − I if xt < xF2
D11xt
r−µ − I if xt ≥ xF2 .
(13)
On the other hand, if D10−D11D10 >
1
β1(µ)
, then there exists a unique threshold x∗ ∈ (0, xF2 ) such that µ is
the worst–case on {Xt < x∗} and µ is the worst–case on {x∗ ≤ Xt < xF2 }. Furthermore, in this case the
leader value function is given by
L1(xt) =

D10xt
r−µ − 1β1(µ)
D10x∗
r−µ
(
xt
x∗
)β1(µ) − I if xt < x∗
D10xt
r−µ +
(x∗)β2(µ)xβ1(µ)t −(x∗)β1(µ)xβ2(µ)t
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )
β1(µ)−(x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
(
D11
r−µ − D10r−µ
)
xF2
+
(xF2 )
β1(µ)x
β2(µ)
t −(xF2 )β2(µ)x
β1(µ)
t
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )
β1(µ)−(x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
[(
1− 1β1(µ)
)
D10
r−µ − D10r−µ
]
x∗ − I if x∗ ≤ xt < xF2
D11xt
r−µ − I if xt ≥ xF2 ,
(14)
where β1(µ) > 1 and β2(µ) < 0 are the positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation 1/2σ2β(µ)(β(µ)−
1) + µβ(µ)− r = 0, respectively.
In case the worst–case is not trivially given by the lowest possible trend, the value function contains the
terms
(x∗)β2(µ)xβ1(µ)t − (x∗)β1(µ)xβ2(µ)t
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
and
(xF2 )
β1(µ)x
β2(µ)
t − (xF2 )β2(µ)xβ1(µ)t
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
,
which admit a clear interpretation: they represent the expected discount factor of the first hitting time of
firm 2’s follower threshold conditional on it being reached before x∗ is reached, and the expected discount
factor of the first hitting time of x∗ conditional on it being reached before firm 2’s follower threshold,
respectively.
Figure 1 depicts the implications of Theorem (1). In case the drop of the payoff from being the only one
who has invested to the situation that both players have invested is sufficiently big, the value x∗ distinguishes
between the regions where each of the two “fears” dominates.
For the proof of Theorem (1), we need a different approach compared to the standard literature on real
option games. We use backward stochastic differential equations and g-expectations as introduced by Peng
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Figure 1: The critical value x∗ differentiates between two “regimes”.
(1997). The advantage of this approach lies in the fact that we know the value of our problem at the entry
point of the follower. This value yields the starting point for a backward stochastic differential equation. The
non–linear Feynman–Kac formula reduces the problem to solving a particular non–linear partial differential
equation. From this PDE we are eventually able to derive the worst–case prior.
Proof.
Denote
Yt := inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τF2
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft] .
Applying the time consistency property of a strongly rectangular set of density generators gives
Yt = inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τF2
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft]
= inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
inf
Q′∈PΘ
EQ
′
[∫ τF2
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣FτF2
] ∣∣∣Ft]
= inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τF2
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+ e−r(τ
F
2 −t) inf
Q′∈PΘ
EQ
′
[∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−τ
F
2 )D11Xsds
∣∣∣FτF2
] ∣∣∣Ft]
= inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τF2
t
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+ e−r(τ
F
2 −t)Φ(xτF2 )
∣∣∣Ft] ,
where
Φ(xt) := inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[ ∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft] = D11xt
r − µ . (15)
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Chen and Epstein (2002) show that Yt solves the BSDE
−dYt = g(Zt)dt− ZtdBt,
where, in this case, the generator, g, is given by
g(z) = −κ|z| − rYt +XtD10.
The terminal boundary condition is given by
YτF2
= Φ(xF2 ),
In the terminology of Peng (2013), we say that the leader value is the g–expectation of the random
variable e−r(τF2 −t)Φ(xF2 ), i.e.
Yt = Eg[e−r(τ
F
2 −t)Φ(xF2 )|Ft].
Denote the present value of the leader payoff by L, i.e.
L(xt) = Yt.
The non–linear Feynman–Kac formula3 (Peng, 2013, Theorem 3) implies that L solves the non–linear
PDE
LXL(x) + g(σxL
′(x)) = 0,
whereLX is the characteristic operator of the SDE (1). Hence, L solves
1
2
σ2x2L′′(x) + µxL′(x)− κσx ∣∣L′(x)∣∣− rL(x) +D10x = 0. (16)
Expression (16) implies that µ is the worst–case on the set {x ≤ xF2 |L′(x) > 0} and µ is the worst–case on
{x ≤ xF2 |L′(x) < 0}.
The unique viscosity solution to the PDE (16) is given by
L(µ, x) =
D10x
r − µ +Ax
β1(µ) +Bxβ2(µ), (17)
where µ equals either µ or µ. The constants A and B are determined by some boundary conditions.
One can easily see that for x close to zero we have L′(x) > 0. Now two cases are possible: Either
L′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, xF2 ] or we can find (at least) one point x∗ at which the worst–case changes from µ
to µ.
3Note that Peng (1991) shows that the non–linear Feynman–Kac formula not only holds for deterministic times but also first
exit times like τF2 , even if it does not hold a.s. that {τF2 <∞}.
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Let us first assume that µ is always the worst–case. Since β2(µ) < 0, we have B = 0. In order to
determine the constant A, we apply a value matching condition at xF2 that gives
L(µ, xF2 ) =
D10x
F
2
r − µ +A1x
F
2
β1(µ)
=
D11x
F
2
r − µ .
This implies
A1 =
D10 −D11
r − µ x
F
2
1−β1(µ)
,
and therefore
L(xt) =
D10xt
r − µ +
(
xt
xF2
)β1(µ) D11 −D10
r − µ x
F
2 . (18)
We get that µ is always the worst–case on [0, xF2 ] if and only if L
′(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≤ xF2 . Due to the
continuity and concavity of the value function (18), this is equivalent to the condition
L′(xF2 ) ≥ 0.
Therefore,
L′(xF2 ) =
D10
r − µ +
(
D11 −D10
r − µ
)
β1(µ)
(
xF2
xF2
)β1(µ)−1
≥ 0
⇐⇒ D11 −D10 ≥ − D10
β1(µ)
⇐⇒ D10 −D11
D10
≤ 1
β1(µ)
.
If this condition is not satisfied, the worst–case changes at some point x∗ < xF2 from µ to µ, where x∗
is determined by the condition L′(x∗) = 0. We denote by L˜1(µ, x) the solution to (17) on [0, x∗] and by
Lˆ1(µ, x) the solution to (17) on [x∗, xF2 ]. The unknowns in equation (17) are determined by applying twice a
value matching condition and once a smooth pasting condition (see also Cheng and Riedel (2013)). Indeed,
it must hold that
1. Lˆ1(µ, xF2 ) = Φ(x
F
2 ),
2. L˜1(µ, x∗) = Lˆ1(µ, x∗),
3. L˜′1(µ, x
∗) = Lˆ′1(µ, x
∗).
In case µ is not always the worst–case, the unique viscosity solution of (17) is given by
L(xt) = 1xt<x∗L˜1(µ, xt) + 1xt≥x∗Lˆ1(µ, xt),
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where
L˜1(µ, xt) =
D10xt
r − µ −
1
β1(µ)
D10x
∗
r − µ
(xt
x∗
)β1(µ)
,
and
Lˆ1(µ, xt) =
D10xt
r − µ +
(x∗)β2(µ)xβ1(µ)t − (x∗)β1(µ)xβ2(µ)t
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
(xF2 )
β1(µ)x
β2(µ)
t − (xF2 )β2(µ)xβ1(µ)t
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
x∗.
We can easily verify that Lˆ1 and L˜1 satisfy the boundary conditions. Indeed,
Lˆ1(µ, x
F
2 ) =
D10x
F
2
r − µ +
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
(xF2 )
β1(µ)(xF2 )
β2(µ) − (xF2 )β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ)
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
x∗
=
D10x
F
2
r − µ +
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
=
D11x
F
2
r − µ
=Φ(xF2 ).
and
Lˆ1(µ, x
∗) =
D10x
∗
r − µ +
(x∗)β2(µ)(x∗)β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(x∗)β2(µ)
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
(xF2 )
β1(µ)(x∗)β2(µ) − (xF2 )β2(µ)(x∗)β1(µ)
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
x∗
=
D10x
∗
r − µ +
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
x∗
=
D10x
∗
r − µ −
1
β1(µ)
D10x
∗
r − µ
=L˜1(µ, x
∗).
To prove the smooth pasting condition at x∗ requires a bit more work. Firstly, we observe that the value x∗
is chosen such that it always holds that L˜′1(µ, x∗) = 0.
The next lemma shows that there exists such a value x∗, which is unique and also satisfies Lˆ1(µ, x∗) = 0.
Lemma 2. If D10−D11D10 >
1
β1(µ)
, then there exists one and only one value x∗ that solves Lˆ′1(µ, x∗) = 0 on
(0, xF2 ].
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Figure 2: The leader and follower value functions of the ambiguous and non–ambiguous firm.
The proof is reported in the Appendix.
Remark 1. The leader value function L1 is always concave on [0, xF2 ] even if the worst–case changes at
some point. We prove this fact in the Appendix.
Figure 2 shows a typical run of the leader and follower value functions of both the ambiguous and the
non–ambiguous firm. We observe that the leader value function of firm 1 drops below its follower value
function if xt is close to xF2 . The reason for that is that x
F
1 and x
F
2 differ (in the illustrated case we have
xF2 < x
F
1 ). That means that the leader and follower value functions hit the shared value function M at
different times. This is the case because xF1 and x
F
2 are determined using a different trend. But even if firms
use the same prior, in some cases we would observe this pattern, namely if we consider cost–asymmetric
firms, i.e. if η > 1.
3.3 Optimal Leader Threshold
Next we want to determine the optimal time to invest as a leader. Suppose firm 2 knows it will not be
preempted and searches for the optimal time to invest. It then faces at time t the following optimal stopping
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problem:
L∗2(xt) = sup
τ tL,2≥t
EP
[∫ τ tL,2
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF1
τ tL,2
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF1
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− e−r(τ
t
L,2−t)ηI
∣∣∣Ft].
The solution can be found by applying the standard techniques and is well known from the literature: it is
given by
τ tL,2 = inf{s ≥ t|Xs ≥ xL2 },
where
xL2 =
β1(µ)
β1(µ)− 1
ηI(r − µ)
D10 −D00 .
The ambiguous firm solves the following optimal stopping problem
L∗1(xt) = sup
τ tL,1≥t
inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ tL,1
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds− e−r(τ
t
L,1−t)I
∣∣∣Ft].
Again, in order to determine this stopping time for the ambiguous firm, we cannot apply the standard pro-
cedure. Nevertheless, the stopping time does not differ from the one of a non–ambiguous firm given a drift
µ.
Proposition 1. The optimal time to invest as a leader for the ambiguous firm is given by
τ tL,1 = inf{s ≥ t|Xs ≥ xL1 },
where
xL1 =
β1(µ)
β1(µ)− 1
I(r − µ)
D10 −D00 .
For the proof we refer to the Appendix.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
The appropriate equilibrium concept for a game with ambiguity as described here is not immediately clear.
In this paper, we consider two types of equilibria: preemptive equilibria in which firms try to preempt each
other at some times where it is sub–optimal to invest, and sequential equilibria, where one firm invests at its
optimal time.
16
4.1 Strategies and Payoffs
The appropriate notion of subgame perfect equilibrium for our game is developed in Riedel and Steg (2014).
Let T denote the set of stopping times with respect to the filtration (Ft)t≥0. The set T will act as the set
of (pure) strategies. Given the definitions of the leader, follower and shared payoffs above, the timing game
is
Γ =
〈
(Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 ,P),P
Θ,T ×T , (Li, Fi,Mi)i=1,2, (pii)i=1,2
〉
,
where, for (τ1, τ2) ∈ T ×T ,
pi1(x0) = inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ[L1(x0)1τ1<τ2 + F1(x0)1τ1>τ2 +M1(x0)1τ1=τ2 ], and
pi2(x0) = EP[L2(x0)1τ1>τ2 + F2(x0)1τ1<τ2 +M2(x0)1τ1=τ2 ].
The subgame starting at stopping time ϑ ∈ T is the tuple
Γϑ =
〈
(Ω,F , (Ft)t≥ϑ,P),PΘ,Tϑ ×Tϑ, (Li, Fi,Mi)i=1,2, (piϑi )i=1,2
〉
,
where Tϑ is the set of stopping times no smaller than ϑ a.s.,
Tϑ := {τ ∈ T |τ ≥ ϑ,P− a.s.},
and, for (τ1, τ2) ∈ Tϑ ×Tϑ,
piϑ1 (xϑ) = inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ[L1(xϑ)1τ1<τ2 + F1(xϑ)1τ1>τ2 +M1(xϑ)1τ1=τ2 |Fϑ], and
piϑ2 (xϑ) = E
P[L2(xϑ)1τ1>τ2 + F2(xϑ)1τ1<τ2 +M2(xϑ)1τ1=τ2 |Fϑ].
As is argued in Riedel and Steg (2014), careful consideration has to be given to the appropriate notion of
strategy. They show that the notion of extended mixed strategy is versatile and intuitively appealing. For the
subgame Γϑ this is a pair of processes (Gϑ, αϑ), both taking values in [0, 1], with the following properties.4
1. Gϑ is adapted, has right–continuous and non–decreasing sample paths, with Gϑ(s) = 0 for all s < ϑ,
P− a.s.
2. αϑ is progressively measurable with right–continuous sample paths whenever its value is in (0, 1),
P− a.s.
3. On {t ≥ ϑ}, it holds that
αϑ(t) > 0⇒ Gϑ(t) = 1, P-a.s.
4Note that the properties below hold for all Q ∈PΘ if they hold for P, because all measures inPΘ are equivalent.
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We use the convention that
Gϑ(0−) ≡ 0, Gϑ(∞) ≡ 1, and αϑ(∞) ≡ 1.
For our purposes extended mixed strategies are, in fact, more general than necessary. Therefore, we
will restrict attention to what we will call extended pure strategies. For the subgame Γϑ this is a pair of
extended mixed strategies (Gϑi , α
ϑ
i )i=1,2, where G
ϑ
i is restricted to take values in {0, 1}. In other words, in
an extended pure strategy a firm does not mix over stopping times, but potentially mixes over its “investment
intensity” αϑ.
An extended pure strategy for the game Γ is then a collection (Gϑ, αϑ)ϑ∈T of extended pure strategies
in subgames Γϑ, ϑ ∈ T satisfying the time consistency conditions that for all ϑ, ν ∈ T it holds that
1. ν ≤ t ∈ R+ ⇒ Gϑ(t) = Gϑ(ν−) + (1−Gϑ(ν−))Gν(t), P-a.s. on {ϑ ≤ ν},
2. αϑ(τ) = αν(τ), P-a.s., for all τ ∈ T .
The importance of the α component in the definition of extended pure strategy becomes obvious in the
definition of payoffs. Essentially α allows both for immediate investment and coordination between firms.
It leads to investment probabilities that can be thought of as the limits of conditional stage investment
probabilities of discrete–time behavioral strategies with vanishing period length (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985)). In the remainder, let τˆϑi be the first time that α
ϑ
i is strictly positive, and let τˆ
ϑ be the first time that
at least one αϑ is non–zero in the subgame Γϑ, i.e.
τˆϑi = inf{t ≥ ϑ|αϑi (t) > 0}, and τˆϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ|αϑ1 (t) + αϑ2 (t) > 0},
respectively. At time τˆϑ the extended pure strategies induce a probability measure on the state space
Λ = { {Firm 1 becomes the leader}, {Firm 2 becomes the leader}, {Both firms invest simultaneously} } ,
for which we will use the shorthand notation
Λ = { (L, 1), (L, 2),M } .
Riedel and Steg (2014) show that the probability measure on Λ, induced by the pair (αϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 ), is given by
λϑL,i(τˆ
ϑ) =

αϑ
i,τˆϑ
(1−αϑ
j,τˆϑ
)
αϑ
i,τˆϑ
+αϑ
j,τˆϑ
−αϑ
i,τˆϑ
αϑ
j,τˆϑ
if τˆϑi = τˆ
ϑ
j and α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i ), α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
i ) > 0
1 if τˆϑi < τˆ
ϑ
j , or τˆ
ϑ
i = τˆ
ϑ
j and α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
j ) = 0
0 if τˆϑi > τˆ
ϑ
j , or τˆ
ϑ
i = τˆ
ϑ
j and α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
j ) = 0
1
2
(
lim inft↓τˆϑi
αϑi (t)(1−αϑj (t))
αϑi (t)+α
ϑ
j (t)−αϑi (t)αϑj (t)
if τˆϑi = τˆ
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i ) = α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
j ) = 0,
+lim supt↓τˆϑi
αϑi (t)(1−αϑj (t))
αϑi (t)+α
ϑ
j (t)−αϑi (t)αϑj (t)
)
and αϑi (τˆ
ϑ
i +), α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
j +) > 0,
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and
λϑM (τˆ
ϑ) =

0 if τˆϑi = τˆ
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i ) = α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
i ) = 0, and α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i +), α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
i +) > 0
αϑ
i,τˆϑ
αϑ
j,τˆϑ
αϑ
i,τˆϑ
+αϑ
j,τˆϑ
−αϑ
i,τˆϑ
αϑ
j,τˆϑ
otherwise.
Note the following:
1. If τˆϑi < τˆ
ϑ
j there is no coordination problem: firm i becomes the leader λ-a.s. at τˆ
ϑ
i ;
2. If τˆϑi = τˆ
ϑ
j , but α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
j ) = 0, there is no coordination problem: firm i becomes the leader λ-a.s. at τˆ
ϑ
i ;
3. In the degenerate case where τˆϑi = τˆ
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i ) = α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
j ) = 0, and α
ϑ
i (τˆ
ϑ
i +), α
ϑ
j (τˆ
ϑ
j +) > 0, the
leader role is assigned at time τˆϑi , effectively on the basis of the flip of a fair coin;
4. Firm 1 is not ambiguous over the measure λ.
In order to derive the payoffs to firms, let τϑG,i denote the first time that G
ϑ
i jumps to one, i.e.
τϑG,i = inf{t ≥ ϑ|Gϑi (t) > 0}.
The payoff to the ambiguous firm of a pair of extended pure strategies ((G1, α1), (G2, α2)) in the sub-
game Γϑ is given by
V ϑ1 (G
ϑ
1 , α
ϑ
1 , G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 ) := inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τϑG,1<min{τϑG,2,τˆϑ}
(∫ τϑG,1
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τϑG,1
e−r(s−ϑ)D10Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds− e−r(τ
ϑ
G,1−ϑ)I
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τϑG,2<min{τϑG,1,τˆϑ}
(∫ τϑG,2
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds+
∫ τF1
τϑG,2
e−r(s−ϑ)D01Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF1
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xs − e−r(τF1 −ϑ)I
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τϑG,1=τ
ϑ
G,2<τˆ
ϑ
(∫ τϑG,1
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τϑG,1
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
L,1(τˆ
ϑ)
(∫ τˆϑ
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ τF2
τˆϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds− e−r(τ
ϑ
G,1−ϑ)I
)∣∣∣Fϑ
]
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+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
L,2(τˆ
ϑ)
(∫ τˆϑ
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ τF1
τˆϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D01Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF1
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xs − e−r(τF1 −ϑ)I
)∣∣∣Fϑ
]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
M (τˆ
ϑ)
(∫ τˆϑ
ϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D00Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τˆϑ
e−r(s−ϑ)D11Xsds
)∣∣∣Fϑ].
Hence, the payoff of the ambiguous firm can written as
V ϑ1 (G
ϑ
1 , α
ϑ
1 , G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 ) := inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τϑG,1<min{τϑG,2,τˆϑ}L1(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τϑG,2<min{τϑG,1,τˆϑ}F1(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τϑG,1=τ
ϑ
G,2<τˆ
ϑM1(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
L,1(τˆ
ϑ)L1(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
L,2(τˆ
ϑ)F1(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+ inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
M (τˆ
ϑ)M1(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] .
In the same way, the payoff for the unambiguous firm can be written as
V ϑ2 (G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 , G
ϑ
1 , α
ϑ
1 ) :=E
P
[
1τϑG,2<min{τϑG,2,τˆϑ}L2(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+EP
[
1τϑG,1<min{τϑG,2,τˆϑ}F2(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+EP
[
1τϑG,1=τ
ϑ
G,2<τˆ
ϑM2(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+EP
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
L,2(τˆ
ϑ)L2(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+EP
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
L,1(τˆ
ϑ)F2(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
+EP
[
1τˆϑ≤min{τϑG,1,τϑG,1}λ
ϑ
M (τˆ
ϑ)M2(xϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ].
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4.2 Preemptive and Sequential Equilibria
An equilibrium for the subgame Γϑ is a pair of extended pure strategies
(
(G¯ϑ1 , α¯
ϑ
1 ), (G¯
ϑ
2 , α¯
ϑ
2 )
)
, such that for
each firm i = 1, 2 and every extended pure strategy (Gϑi , α
ϑ
i ) it holds that
V ϑi (G¯
ϑ
i , α¯
ϑ
i , G¯
ϑ
j , α¯
ϑ
j ) ≥ V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , G¯ϑj , α¯ϑj ),
for j 6= i. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a pair of extended pure strategies ((G¯1, α¯1), (G¯2, α¯2)), such
that for each ϑ ∈ T the pair ((G¯ϑ1 , α¯ϑ1 ), (G¯ϑ2 , α¯ϑ2 )) is an equilibrium in the subgame Γϑ.
There are several types of equilibria of interest in this model. Fix ϑ ∈ T . For firm i we denote the
optimal time of investment, assuming that the other firm cannot preempt, in the subgame Γϑ by τϑL,i, i.e.
τϑL,i = inf{t ≥ ϑ|Xt ≥ xLi }.
We also define the preemption region as the part of the state space where both firms prefer to be the leader
rather than the follower, i.e.
P = {x ∈ R+|(L1(x)− F1(x)) ∧ (L2(x)− F2(x)) > 0}.
The first hitting time of P in the subgame Γϑ is denoted by τϑP .
We distinguish between two different equilibrium concepts. Lemma (3) establishes existence of a pre-
emptive equilibrium.
Lemma 3. (Riedel and Steg (2014)) Suppose ϑ ∈ T satisfies ϑ = τϑP P− a.s. Then
(
(Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 ), (G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 )
)
given by
αϑi (t) =

1 if t = τ tP , L
j
t = F
j
t , and (L
i
t > F
i
t or F
j
t = M
j
t )
1L1t>F 1t 1L2t>F 2t
Ljt−F jt
Ljt−Mjt
otherwise,
for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞) and Gϑi = 1t≥ϑ, i = 1, 2, j ∈ {1, 2} i, are an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ.
In this kind of equilibrium both firms try to preempt each other. Investment takes place sooner than it
optimally would, i.e. the time one firm would invest without the fear of being preempted. The resulting
equilibrium in the latter case is called sequential equilibrium. For certain underlying parameters, the pre-
emption time τϑP is greater than the optimal investment time τ
ϑ
L,i of some firm i. A sequential equilibrium is
then given by the next lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose ϑ = τϑL,i < τ
ϑ
P , P-a.s. for one i ∈ {1, 2}. Then
(
(Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1 ), (G
ϑ
2 , α
ϑ
2 )
)
given by
αϑi (ϑ) = 1, G
ϑ
i (t) = 0 for all t < ϑ, G
ϑ
j (t) = 0 for all t ≤ ϑ
is an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ.
21
Proof. The stopping time τϑL,i is determined in Proposition (1) as the stopping time that maximizes the
leader payoff. Hence, without the threat of being preempted by its opponent, i.e. τϑL,i < τ
ϑ
P P-a.s., it is not
optimal to deviate for firm i. Firm j does not want to stop before τϑL,i as its payoff of becoming the leader is
strictly smaller than becoming the follower up to τϑP .
Now, we are finally able to formulate a subgame perfect equilibrium for our game.
Theorem 2. There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium ((G1, α1), (G2, α2)), where for each ϑ ∈ T , αϑi
and Gϑ1 given by
(i) Lemma (3) if either ϑ ≥ τϑP P-a.s. or τϑP ≤ τϑL,i P-a.s.
(ii) Lemma (4) otherwise (i.e. ϑ < τϑP P-a.s. and τ
ϑ
P > τ
ϑ
L,i P-a.s.).
Proof. Optimality for case (ii) follows along the same lines as in the proof of Lemma (4).
If ϑ ≥ τϑP P− a.s., then optimality for case (i) follows directly from Lemma (3). What remains to prove
is that, in case ϑ < τϑP P− a.s., neither of the firms wants to invest sooner than τϑP .
We start with firm 2. Suppose that firm 1 plays the preemption equilibrium strategy. Then if firm 2 plays
the preemption strategy, its payoff is V2(x) = Ex[e−rτPL2(xP )], for any x < xP . This is the case, because,
either the other firm is indifferent between the leader and follower role at xP , in which case firm 2 becomes
the leader, or firm 2 is indifferent in which case F2(xP ) = L2(xP ).
Note that we have V2(x) = Ex[e−rτPL2(xP )] =
(
x
xP
)β1(µ)
L2(xP ) (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994,
Chapter 9, Appendix A)). V2 is a strictly increasing function, with V2(xP ) = L2(xP ) and V2(0) = 0 >
L2(0), so that V2(x) > L2(x) for any x < xP .
The only deviations τˆ that could potentially give a higher payoff have τˆ < τP , P-a.s. Consider the first
hitting time τˆ of some xˆ < xP . Let Vˆ2 denote the payoff to firm 2 of this strategy (while the other firm plays
its preemption strategy). For xˆ ≤ x < xP , it holds that Vˆ2(x) = L2(x) < V2(x).
For x < xˆ, note that Vˆ2(x) =
(
x
xˆ
)β1(µ) L2(xˆ) = L2(xˆ)xˆβ1(µ)xβ1(µ). Consider the mapping x 7→ L2(x)xβ1(µ) . This
function attains its maximum at xL2 > xP . Therefore, its derivative is positive on (0, xP ), implying that
V2(x) > Vˆ2(x). Any stopping time τ can be written as a mixture of first hitting times. So, no stopping time
τˆ with τˆ < τP , P-a.s. yields a higher payoff than τP .
For firm 1, the argument is similar after realizing that V1(x) =
L1(xP )
x
β1(µ)
P
xβ1(µ) and Vˆ1(x) =
L1(xˆ)
xˆβ1(µ)
xβ1(µ).
This holds because xP < xL1 < x
∗, so that µ is the trend under the worst–case measure for every x ∈ (0, xP ].
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Figure 3: Thresholds for varying κ, with D10 = 1.8, D11 = 1, D01 = 0, D00 = 0, r = 0.1, σ = 0.1,
µ = 0.04, I = 100 and η = 1. The black line indicates the threshold for first investment in equilibrium.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of equilibria with respect to a change of the degree of ambiguity,
κ; the volatility, σ; and the cost difference, η, respectively.
5.1 Comparative Statics With Respect to κ
Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) argued that in a monopolistic model where the firm faces κ–ignorance, an
increase in κ postpones investment and decreases the profit.
In our duopoly framework, we observe that both the leader and the follower value function of the am-
biguous firm decrease with an increase of κ.
For equilibrium outcomes it is important to investigate how investment times (or thresholds) vary with a
change of κ. We find that the follower investment threshold of the ambiguous firm rises if κ increases, as in
Nishimura and Ozaki (2007). Hence, the non–ambiguous firm’s payoff increases as it enjoys the benefits of
being the only one who has invested for a longer time. Further, we easily see that xL1 increases with κ.
To see what happens to the preemption time τ1P := inf{t ≥ 0|L1(xt) ≥ F1(xt)}, we need to consider
L1 − F1. Both functions L1 and F1 decline by a decrease of κ. However, due to the complexity of the
ambiguous firm’s leader value function, it is not possible to come up with an analytic result about which
function decreases more. For this reason, we consider some numerical examples which suggest that the
23
0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
volatility (σ)
th
re
sh
ol
d
 
 
Leader threshold firm 1
Leader threshold firm 2
Preemption threshold firm 1
Preemption threshold firm 2
Sequential: 
Firm 2 
moves first
Preemption: Firm 2 
moves first
Figure 4: Thresholds for varying σ, with D10 = 1.8, D11 = 1, D01 = 0, D00 = 0, r = 0.1, κ = 0.5,
µ = 0.04. I = 100 and η = 1. The black line indicates the threshold for first investment in equilibrium.
leader function is more affected by a change of κ than the follower function.
Figure 3 depicts the change of the leader thresholds as well as the preemption thresholds of both firms
with respect to κ. Starting with completely symmetric firms (η = 1 and κ = 0), Figure 3 shows that both
the preemption threshold and the leader threshold of firm 1 increase with κ. This indicates that L1 decreases
more in κ than F1. This observation makes sense; if it were the other way around, firm 1 could benefit from
an increase of κ. Indeed, if firm 1’s preemption threshold would decrease more than firm 2’s, firm 1 might
benefit by receiving the leader role for ever bigger κ.
Note that there is a qualitative change of equilibrium around κ ≈ .48. For smaller values of κ there is a
preemption equilibrium, where firm 2 moves first at the preemption threshold of firm 1. For larger values
of κ, firm 1’s preemption threshold is so high that firm 2 can invest at its leader threshold, i.e. there is a
sequential equilibrium.
5.2 Comparative Statics With Respect to σ
Comparative statics with respect to the volatility σ are even more complex, because a change in σ affects
not only the volatility but also the interval of possible trends, since [µ, µ] = [µ − σκ, µ + σκ]. Note that
a change in σ and a change in κ of the same magnitude have exactly the same impact on the interval of
possible trends.
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Figure 5: Thresholds for varying η with D10 = 1.8, D11 = 1, D01 = 0, D00 = 0, r = 0.1, σ = 0.1,
µ = 0.04, I = 100 and κ = 0.5. The black line indicates the threshold for first investment in equilibrium.
From the standard literature on real options it is well known that an increase of σ increases the investment
threshold of a monopolistic firm in a purely risky environment (cf. Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)).
Figure 4 shows what happens to the investment thresholds in our framework. All thresholds for both firms
increase with the volatility. Due to the effect on the interval of possible trends, however, firm 1’s thresholds
rise much stronger.
There is a qualitative change of equilibrium around σ ≈ .091. For smaller values of σ there is a pre-
emption equilibrium, where firm 2 moves first at the preemption threshold of firm 1. For larger values of σ,
firm 1’s preemption threshold is so high that firm 2 can invest at its leader threshold, i.e. there is a sequential
equilibrium.
5.3 Comparative Statics With Respect to η
In a purely risky framework, the firm that has the lower investment cost always becomes the leader (cf.
Pawlina and Kort (2006)). This result, however, might change if ambiguity is introduced. Figure 5 shows
that even if the the non–ambiguous firm has a higher cost of investment, it might become the leader anyway.
Ambiguity, therefore, might outbalance the cost advantage of firm 1.
From Figure 5 we can observe that the preemption threshold as well as the leader threshold of firm 2
increase with η. To the far right, there does not even exist a preemption threshold anymore, as the cost dis-
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advantage is so big that firm 2’s leader function always lies below its follower function on [0, xF1 ]. Firm 1’s
leader threshold is unaffected by a change of η. Its preemption threshold, however, is (slightly) decreasing.
The reason for this fact might not be obvious in case condition (12) is not satisfied. First note that firm
1’s follower function is not affected by a change of η. Further note that the preemption point can only lie
in the region where L1 is increasing. This means that, if the worst–case changes at some point, then the
preemption point is smaller than x∗. Thus, the function needed to be considered is
D10xt
r − µ −
1
β1(µ)
D10x
∗
r − µ
(xt
x∗
)β1(µ) − I.
This function is also not directly affected by a change of η. Yet, due to the fact that xF2 increases with η, L1
increases in the region [x∗, xF2 ]. Since the smooth pasting condition has to be fulfilled, this implies that x∗
moves to the left. This, however, means that L1 is also increasing in the region before x∗ is reached. This
implies that the preemption threshold of firm 1 is decreasing.
There are several points where the qualitative nature of equilibrium changes. For small values of η, firm 2
is the first firm to invest and it does so at its leader threshold; this represents a sequential equilibrium. In
this region, no preemption thresholds exist, because firm 2’s advantage is so great that firm 1 would never
wish to preempt. For values of η approximately in the interval [.95, 1.35], firm 2 invests first at firm 1’s
preemption threshold in a preemptive equilibrium. For even larger values of η, approximately in the interval
[1.35, 1.5], the cost disadvantage becomes large enough relative to firm 1’s ambiguity that the role of first
mover switches: firm 1 invests first at firm 2’s preemption threshold in a preemptive equilibrium. Finally,
for η > 1.5, the cost disadvantage is so large that firm 2’s preemption threshold lies above firm 1’s leader
threshold, so that firm 1 invests first at its leader threshold in a sequential equilibrium.
6 The Case where Both Firms are Ambiguous
We want to emphasize that our analysis is independent of the assumption that only one of the firms is
ambiguous. Throughout the paper, this assumption is made in order to elaborate the difference that an
introduction of ambiguity makes in contrast to a purely risky world.
We may very well allow for both firms to be ambiguous about the trend of the underlying dynamics. We
even do not need to require that the firms have the same degree of ambiguity (same κ).
In fact, for the analysis of the worst–case prior, it is only required that the degree of ambiguity and the cost
of investment of each player are common knowledge (such that each firm is able to compute the follower
threshold of its competitor). The determination of the follower and leader value functions of a second
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Figure 6: Thresholds for varying κ1, with D10 = 1.8, D11 = 1, D01 = 0, D00 = 0, r = 0.1, σ = 0.1,
µ = 0.04, η = 1, I = 100 and κ2 = 0.3. The black line indicates the threshold for first investment in
equilibrium.
ambiguous firm is completely analogous to the analysis in Section 3.2. Recall that ambiguity is assumed
not to be about strategies but about payoffs exclusively. This implies, knowing the new value functions, the
equilibrium analysis follows along the same lines as presented in Section 4.
In Figure 6, we draw firms’ thresholds for the case that both players are κ–ignorant, possibly to a different
degree. The firms are assumed to be symmetric in terms of the investment costs. The degree of ambiguity
for firm 2 is κ2 = 0.3. We vary the degree of ambiguity for the first firm and see that both the preemption
threshold and the leader threshold of firm 1 are strictly increasing, whereas the preemption threshold as well
as the leader threshold of firm 2 are slightly decreasing.
We now only get preemptive equilibria: firm 1 preempts firm 2 for small values of κ1, whereas firm 2
preempts firm 1 for larger values of κ1. Note that the domain of κ1 is bounded by the condition that r > µ,
i.e. that κ1 < (r − µ)/σ. This means that Figure 6 can not be extended beyond κ1 ≈ .6. So, while one
might expect that for κ1 > .6 firm 2 invests first in a sequential equilibrium, this can not be verified.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma (2)
In this section, we show that if the worst–case for the leader value is not always given by the worst possible
trend, there exists a unique value x∗ at which the worst–case changes from µ to µ.
Proof. The critical value x∗ is found by applying the smooth pasting condition Lˆ1(µ, x∗) = 0. The first
derivative of Lˆ1 is given by
Lˆ′1(µ, x) =
D10
r − µ +
β1(µ)(x
∗)β2(µ)xβ1(µ)−1 − β2(µ)(x∗)β1(µ)xβ2(µ)−1
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
β2(µ)(x
F
2 )
β1(µ)xβ2(µ)−1 − β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)xβ1(µ)−1
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
[(
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
]
x∗.
In order to prove the existence of x∗, we will show that if x∗ ↑ xF2 , Lˆ′1(µ, x∗) becomes negative, and if
x∗ ↓ 0, Lˆ′1(µ, x∗) becomes positive.
We have
Lˆ′1(µ, x
∗) =
D10
r − µ +
(β1(µ)− β2(µ))(x∗)β1(µ)+β2(µ)−1
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
β2(µ)(x
F
2 )
β1(µ)(x∗)β2(µ) − β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)(x∗)β1(µ)
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
[(
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
]
.
Clearly, limx∗↓xF2 Lˆ
′
1(µ, x
∗) has the same sign as the following expression.
D10
r − µ
(
(xF2 )
β2(µ)(xF2 )
β1(µ) − (xF2 )β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
)
(A.1)
+ (β1(µ)− β2(µ)) (xF2 )β1(µ)+β2(µ)
[
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ −
(
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ +
D10
r − µ
]
.
Using the fact that 1β1(µ) <
D10−D11
D10
yields that (A.1) is smaller than
(β1(µ)− β2(µ)) (xF2 )β1(µ)+β2(µ)
1
r − µ (D11 −D10 +D10 −D11) = 0. (A.2)
Considering the case x∗ ↓ 0, one can easily see that limx∗↓0 Lˆ′1(µ, x∗) has the same sign as
lim
x∗↓0
{
D10
r − µ
(
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )
β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
)
+ (β1(µ)− β2(µ)) (x∗)β1(µ)+β2(µ)−1
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
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+ β2(µ)(x
F
2 )
β1(µ)(x∗)β2(µ) − β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)(x∗)β1(µ)
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)}
= lim
x∗↓0
{
(x∗)β2(µ)
(
D10
r − µ
(
(xF2 )
β2(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)−β2(µ)
)
+ (β1(µ)− β2(µ))(x∗)β1(µ)−1
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
(
β2(µ)(x
F
2 )
β1(µ) − β1(µ)(x∗)β1(µ)−β2(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
)((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
))}
= lim
x∗↓0
(x∗)β2(µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→+∞
{
D10
r − µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(xF2 )β2(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)−β2(µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0

+ (β1(µ)− β2(µ))(x∗)β1(µ)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−β1(µ)(x∗)β1(µ)−β2(µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
((1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
}
.
Therefore, we get Lˆ′1(µ, x∗) > 0 for x∗ close to 0. Due to continuity of L′2 on [0, xF2 ], we can find in that
region a solution to Lˆ′1(µ, x∗) = 0.
The uniqueness of x∗ is automatically given by the uniqueness of the solution to PDE (16).
B Concavity of L1
In this section we prove that the leader function of the ambiguous firm is concave on [0, xF2 ] . In case the
worst–case prior is always induced by the lowest possible trend, this statement is trivial. The next proof
shows that concavity is not lost even if the worst–case changes at some point.
Proof. Suppose condition (12) is not satisfied (i.e. µ is not always the worst–case). The concavity of L1(x)
for x < x∗ is trivial. We therefore consider the second derivative of L1(x) in the interval [x∗, xF2 ).
Lˆ′′1(µ, x) =
β1(µ)(β1(µ)− 1)(x∗)β2(µ)xβ1(µ)−2 − β2(µ)(β2(µ)− 1)(x∗)β1(µ)xβ2(µ)−2
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
×
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2
+
β2(µ)(β2(µ)− 1)(xF2 )β1(µ)xβ2(µ)−2 − β1(µ)(β1(µ)− 1)(xF2 )β2(µ)xβ1(µ)−2
(x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 )β1(µ) − (x∗)β1(µ)(xF2 )β2(µ)
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×
[(
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
]
x∗.
Now, we have
β1(µ)(β1(µ)− 1)xβ1(µ)−2
[(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2 (x
∗)β2(µ)
−
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
x∗(xF2 )
β2(µ)
]
< β1(µ)(β1(µ)− 1)xβ1(µ)−2x∗(xF2 )β2(µ)
[(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
−
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)]
= β1(µ)(β1(µ)− 1)xβ1(µ)−2x∗(xF2 )β2(µ)
[
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ +
1
β1(µ)
D10
r − µ
]
< β1(µ)(β1(µ)− 1)xβ1(µ)−2x∗(xF2 )β2(µ)
1
r − µ [D11 −D10 +D10 −D11]
= 0,
where we used the fact that x∗(xF2 )β2(µ) < (x∗)β2(µ)(xF2 ) (because x∗ < xF2 and β2(µ) < 0) and
D10−D11
D10
> 1β1(µ) .
In a similar, way we can show that
β2(µ)(β2(µ)− 1)xβ2(µ)−2
[
−
(
D11
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
xF2 (x
∗)β1(µ)
+
((
1− 1
β1(µ)
)
D10
r − µ −
D10
r − µ
)
x∗(xF2 )
β1(µ)
]
< 0,
which proves the concavity of L1.
C Proof of Proposition (1)
The proof follows along similar lines to the proof of Theorem (1). We use the same procedure, but now we
consider the value function in the continuation region, i.e. before any investment has taken place. Applying
the BSDE approach with different value matching and smooth pasting conditions eventually yields the
desired stopping time.
Proof.
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Denote
Yt = inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[ ∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ tL,1
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft].
Using the time consistency property of a strongly rectangular set of density generators yields
Yt = inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[ ∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ tL,1
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Ft]
= inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[
inf
Q′∈PΘ
EQ
′
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+
∫ τF2
τ tL,1
e−r(s−t)D10Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−t)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Fτ tL,1
]∣∣∣Ft]
= inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+ e−r(τ
t
L,1−t) inf
Q′∈PΘ
EQ
′
[∫ τF2
τ tL,1
e−r(s−τ
t
L,1)D10Xsds
+
∫ ∞
τF2
e−r(s−τ
t
L,1)D11Xsds
∣∣∣Fτ tL,1
]∣∣∣Ft]
= inf
Q∈PΘ
EQ
[∫ τ tL,1
t
e−r(s−t)D00Xsds+ L1(xτ tL,1)
∣∣∣Ft] .
Following Chen and Epstein (2002), Yt solves the BSDE
−dYt = g(Zt)dt− ZtdBt,
for the generator
g(z) = −κ|z| − rYt +XtD00.
The boundary condition is given by
Yτ tL,1 = L(x
L
1 ),
where L(xL1 ) is given by Theorem (1) and x
L
1 = xτ tL,1 .
Denote the present value of the leader payoff by Λ, i.e.
Λ(xt) = Yt.
The non–linear Feynman–Kac formula implies that Λ solves the non–linear PDE
LXΛ(x) + g(σxΛ
′(x)) = 0.
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Hence, Λ solves
1
2
σ2x2Λ′′(x) + µxΛ′(x)− κσx ∣∣Λ′(x)∣∣− rΛ(x) +D00x = 0. (C.1)
In the continuation region the leader function has to be increasing, hence Λ′ > 0. This implies that µ is the
worst–case in the continuation region.
Therefore, equation (C.1) becomes
1
2
σ2x2Λ′′(x) + (µ− κσ)xΛ′(x)− rΛ(x) +D00x = 1
2
σ2x2Λ′′(x) + µxΛ′(x)− rΛ(x) +D00x = 0.
The general increasing solution to this PDE is
Λ(x) =
D00x
r − µ +A2x
β1(µ).
We have to distinguish two cases here. Either the condition given in Theorem (1) holds which means that
the boundary condition takes the form (13) or the boundary condition becomes (14).
We will show that for both cases, the optimal threshold to invest becomes
xL1 =
β1(µ)
β1(µ)− 1
I(r − µ)
D10 −D00 . (C.2)
If condition (12) is satisfied, the boundary condition is given by
L1(x
L
1 ) =
D10x
L
1
r − µ +
(
xL1
xF2
)β1(µ) D11 −D10
r − µ x
F
2 − I.
Otherwise, the boundary condition is given by
L1(x
L
1 ) =
D10x
L
1
r − µ −
1
β1(µ)
D10x
∗
r − µ
(
xL1
x∗
)β1(µ)
− I.
In addition to the value matching condition, we apply a smooth pasting condition. Here, smooth pasting
implies that the derivatives of the value function Λ and L coincide at xτ tL,1 , i.e.
Λ′(xτ tL,1) = L
′
1(xτ tL,1). (C.3)
This condition ensures differentiability at the investment threshold.
Applying condition (C.3) gives
D00
r − µ + β1(µ)A2x
L
1
β1(µ)−1
=
D10
r − µ + β1(µ)A1x
L
1
β1(µ)−1
,
where
A1 =
(
1
xF2
)β1(µ)−1 D11 −D10
r − µ
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in the first case and
A1 = − 1
β1(µ)
D10x
∗
r − µ
(
1
x∗
)β1(µ)
in the second.
Hence,
A2 =
D10 −D00
r − µ
1
β1(µ)
1
xL1
β1(µ)−1 +A1.
Applying the value matching condition finally yields
D00x
L
1
r − µ +
(
D10 −D00
r − µ
1
β1(µ)
1
xL1
β1(µ)−1 +A1
)
xL1
β1(µ)
=
D10x
L
1
r − µ +A1x
L
1
β1(µ) − I
⇐⇒ D10 −D00
r − µ x
L
1 −
D10 −D00
r − µ
1
β1(µ)
xL1 = I
⇐⇒ β1(µ)− 1
β1(µ)
D10 −D00
r − µ x
L
1 = I,
and therefore, for both cases, it holds that
xL1 =
β1(µ)
β1(µ)− 1
I(r − µ)
D10 −D00 .
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